Is the SANDF properly equipped for its expanding peacekeeping role?

In his State of the Nation address last month, President Thabo Mbeki stated, "[A]mong the greatest achievements of the peoples of Africa in the past two-and-a-half years has been the restoration of peace in the Great Lakes region. We are proud, as South Africans, of the role that our people have played in helping to bring this about - from the young men and women in our National Defence Force to employees of public and private institutions . . . we will continue to work with the sister people of the DRC, as well as Burundi, the Comoros and Sudan, in particular, to ensure that the condition of peace and stability thus far obtained translates without pause into concerted action for economic reconstruction and social development. However . . . we cannot underplay the challenges that we face in dealing with the remaining areas of conflict . . . Our government will respond appropriately and as our capacity permits . . . "

Back in 1994, it looked as if the future role of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was to be a ‘self-defence' force in the mould of Japan's, restricted to the defence of home territory and with minimal counterattack capabilities.

Today, in dramatic contrast, the SANDF finds itself operating as an expeditionary force far from home, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, and the Darfur region of the Sudan. Pretoria to Bujumbura in Burundi is a distance of 2 491 km, to Ndjamena in Chad (the hub for the Darfur operation) it is 4 430 km, while the distance from Berlin to Moscow is only 1 608 km.

Currently, it seems that South Africa has 1 300 military personnel in the DRC, 540 in Darfur, and 750 in Burundi, a total of 2 600; but the numbers in Burundi are being increased to about 1 500 and reinforcements are also being sent to Darfur, which means that, in the near future, South Africa will have some 4 500 troops deployed abroad.

These expeditionary missions are not, officially, combat operations.

Rather, they are peacekeeping or peace support operations, executed in terms of mandates from the United Nations (UN) Security Council or from the African Union (AU).

But, except for the expenditure of ammunition, peacekeeping far from home imposes many of the same demands as expeditionary warfare does, in terms of command and control, communications, logistics, medical support, wear and tear on aircraft, vehicles and equipment, and the need - as far as practically possible - to ensure ‘force protection', that is, the safety and security of the troops, their equipment, and their bases.

Further, peacekeeping can turn very deadly, very fast.

Between its establishment in February 2000 and the end of last year, the UN mission in the DRC, Monuc - in which South African troops are participating - reportedly suffered 96 fatalities, composed of 68 peacekeeping troops, ten military observers, and 18 civilian staff.

For example, on February 25, 2005, nine Bangladeshi UN troops were killed in a clash with rebels in the eastern DRC. Again, in January 2006, eight Guatemalan peacekeeping troops were killed in action against DRC rebel forces.

Indeed, during 2005 Monuc undertook a number of outright combat operations against rebels in the east of the country, with UN ground forces supported from the air by UN attack helicopters.

In one such operation, in December 2005, an estimated 90 rebel gunmen were killed.

Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) have even been employed in combat by UN peacekeepers - in Bosnia, at the end of April 1994, and again in late October of that same year.

MBTs and attack helicopters are not what South Africans think of in connection with UN peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping is, thus, not a soft option, an easy duty with minimal risk to the countries that have committed forces to such missions or to the troops themselves.

Does the SANDF have the right technologies and equipment for what has now become its main operational duty?

And, if it has them, does it have them in sufficient quantities?

Significantly, the recent budget saw an increase of 8,8% for defence in comparison with last year's budget; perhaps, even more otably, the increase over the defence budget forecast in last year's medium-term expenditure framework was 5%.

Given an average South African inflation rate of 5% for last year, this does amount to an increase in real terms, although not a dramatic one.

And, of course, the South African Air Force (SAAF) and Navy (SAN) are already in an advanced stage of re-equipment with new lead-in fighter-trainers (Lift) and light utility helicopters (LUH) already in operational service with the former, and new light frigates and a sub- marine in operational service with the latter.

Deliveries of Hawk Lift and Agusta A109 LUH are continuing, and still to come are 27 Gripen advanced light fighters (one has already been delivered), two submarines, and four maritime helicopters.

But these were all ordered when ‘self-defence' was seen as the SANDF's function, not peacekeeping - how relevant are they to the new mission?

Actually, they are more relevant than might first appear.

Thus, from 1993 to 1996, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) and the Western European Union (not to be confused with the European Union (EU)) operated a joint naval blockade of the former Yugoslavia in support of a UN arms embargo; this involved surface ships, sub- marines and maritime patrol aircraft.

Designated Operation Sharp Guard, it involved ships and aircraft from 11 countries and saw more than 73 000 ships challenged, of which almost 6 000 were boarded and inspected at sea, and 1 500 diverted to ports for inspection.

Sharp Guard was one of the first of the modern peacekeeping operations undertaken in support of the UN, with UN approval, but not directly under the UN.

A similar such operation, mandated by the UN, designated Task Force 150, is currently under way in the north-west Indian Ocean, directed against al-Qaeda and its allies.

By committing forces to the AU force in Darfur, South Africa has shown its willingness to engage in such ‘subcontracted' missions.

A more spectacular example of such a mission was Nato's Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, undertaken in support of beleagured UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, and in which some 400 aircraft from 15 countries flew 3 515 sorties against 338 separate targets within 48 target complexes; 1 026 bombs were dropped, 708 of which were precision-guided, or ‘smart', weapons.

Deliberate Force was launched with the explicit and prior approval of the UN peacekeeping command and, of course, involved the use of modern, high-performance combat and surveillance aircraft.

More recently, although outside the UN framework, in 2000, in Sierra Leone, Britain successfully used high-performance Harrier jets to intimidate rebels, and in 2003, in the DRC, as part of the EU's Operation Artemis, in support of Monuc, the French used Mirage 2000 fighters in the same way.

But the SAAF now has so few fighters (only 26 at the moment) that its ability to deploy a credible minimum number (which, experience shows, is six) for a sustained basis in support of operations outside this country is doubtful.

"The SAAF needs a bare minimum of 38 Gripens," asserts defence analyst and Jane's Information Group South African correspondent Helmoed Romer-Heitman.

Nor is this the only deficiency facing the SAAF: its shortage of attack helicopters (aircraft used in action by the UN in the DRC, remember) is even worse, with currently only 12 Rooivalk in service (only 12 production aircraft were ordered).

"We need at least another dozen Rooivalks," he states.

"South Africa should buy more Rooivalk and transport helicopters," agrees defence journalist Leon Engelbrecht.

"If we want to be serious about going into peacekeeping in Africa, we need big transport helicopters, like the American Chinook, which would complement the SAAF's existing Oryx," affirms Heitman.

"Boeing, which makes them, has offered South Africa totally refurbished Chinooks for about $15-million each, which is incredibly cheap, but the SAAF has not yet made any decision," he reports.

Currently, the SAAF's fixed-wing air transport force is suffering low serviceability and the country is spending significant amounts on chartering large Russian- and Ukrainian-designed and -built transport aircraft to support SANDF forces on peacekeeping duties.

The country has ordered eight Airbus A400M transport aircraft, which will contain South African-designed and -manufactured components; however, deliveries to the SAAF will only start in 2010.

"The A400M is a good call," affirms Engelbrecht.

"Eight is too small a number," warns Heitman. "Fourteen would be better, but 16 is the practical minimum to conduct a proper early entry into, or hot extraction from, a crisis zone."

Eight A400Ms will be too many for peacetime shuttle missions and too few for crisis response missions.

"One option will be to keep the SAAF's current fleet of nine C-130 Hercules through their planned, extended, service life, and then replace them with either additional A400Ms or buy new C-130s to give a high/low mix of transport aircraft," he suggests.

Remaining with aviation, there are issues of airborne surveillance of the ground, on the one hand, and the monitoring of air traffic, on the other.

"Reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft and/or unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) are needed," he cites.

The SANDF does have tactical UAVs, but needs both subtactical, hand-launched UAVs for use by troops on patrol, and medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAVs for sustained surveillance.

South African industry has the capability to supply both these requirements (ATE has developed the Kiwit micro-UAV and Denel has the Bateleur MALE design).

"The SANDF must have the ability to monitor air traffic, whether from ground-based radars or from airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, because the bulk of weapons are moved into, and illegal exports moved out of, African conflict zones by air; even rebel movements are undertaken by air," explains Heitman.

This reliance on air transport by even rebel combatants in Africa illustrates the relevance of ‘Deny Flight' type no-fly zones on the continent and the need for fighters to enforce them.

"A team of two-seat and single-seat Gripens, with air-to-air refuelling tanker support, could fly effective Deny Flight missions - it would be even better, of course, if they had AEW support as well," he points out.

"Good communications are essential, including aircraft acting as airborne relay stations," he stresses.

"Frequency hopping radios and encryption systems are expensive but are no luxury - one can take it as given that the various factions in any conflict zone will be monitoring the UN and SANDF frequencies and practising poor man's electronic warfare," states Engelbrecht.

"Communications intelligence will also be important, including the ability to monitor civilian links, such as cellphones and satellite phones - all the best bandits and guerrilas now use them," remarks Heitman.

Again, South African industry can meet these requirements.

The South African Army faces particular challenges because it will have to prepare for operations in new and unfamiliar environments.

"The Army will need to be able to operate in built-up areas in Africa, including in informal settlements, where dirt roads are the norm; this means that it needs armoured vehicles with at least three axles each (ideally evenly spaced), as those with only two axles can be halted by trenches which can easily be dug across such roads," cites Hietman.

The Casspir armoured personnel carrier currently used by the Army on peacekeeping missions has only two axles; again, local industry can supply a suitable replacement.

Other requirements for urban warfare are established - even in the case, for example, of scaling ladders, ancient technologies which the Army did not previously require.

"Then there is jungle warfare - for this the Army will need such things as chainsaws, and tree-cutting charges, to rapidly create landing zones (LZs), and canopy penetrators for helicopter slings, to insert and extract troops without having to create LZs; none of these are new technologies, but again the SANDF has never had them because it never needed them," he adds.

Oddly, although South Africa has decent sized mountains in the Drakensberg, the Army has no mountain warfare capability, nor (despite the low temperatures which occur in large parts of the country in winter) any good cold weather gear.

The Army's current Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the Ratel, has not yet been deployed on peacekeeping operations, and, although better armed and protected than the Casspir, and equipped with three axles, the modernisation programmes it has been subjected to have not increased its armour and it remains vulnerable to man-portable anti armour weapons such as the well-known RPG series.

Such vulnerabilities are serious because peacekeeping forces generally have to allow the other side to fire first and only then return fire.

The Ratel is planned to be replaced under Project Hoefyster.

"It looks as if Hoefyster will go ahead, and it still looks as if the Finnish Patria AMV will be the platform chosen - the order will be for some 260 vehicles, which is far too few as about 600 are needed," says Heitman.

"The number to be ordered is very small, perhaps enough for two mechanised battalions but not enough to replace the Ratel wholesale," agrees Engelbrecht.

The South African Army actually needs to re-equip at least three, if not four, mechanised battalions, not just two.

Sadly, had local industry been given more time, and had the requirement been for a more realistic number of vehicles, a South African-designed and -manufactured replacement for the Ratel would have been possible.

"RPG-proofing Ratels and Casspirs is a good idea and the US has shown how slat armour or chain-link fencing can be used inexpensively to do so; a more expensive solution is Saab Grintek's LEDS system, which can reportedly destroy an RPG fired as close as 20 m from the vehicle," he affirms. "Ideally, Ratels should be further upgraded and some add-on armour fitted; South African companies Mechanology and Land Systems OMC have separate proposals - this would be cheaper than buying new vehicles to replace the Army's current fleets of Casspirs and Mambas employed in such roles as mortar vehicles," says Heitman.

Other key necessities include better body armour, more nightvision equipment, and more advanced medical technology to treat casualties.

As for the Navy, it is now equipped to effectively undertake blockade operations in low-intensity environments, such as might credibly be required off Somalia.

But it does need a new coastal combatant, able to patrol inshore, to replace its existing strike craft; the SAN is working on such a programme, focused on multi-purpose vessels.

However, Heitman believes that it would be nice if the fleet could also have four to six new strike craft, a little larger than the existing ones, in addition to the planned multipurpose vessels.

And the SAN still needs amphibious ships to transport and deploy Army and Air Force units in areas were no functional ports are available (and ports are scarce along the African coast).

"The Navy is working on selecting and acquiring two such ships, but it really needs three," argues Heitman.

The Navy needs to be able to land an entire battalion group in one operation, which would need two ships; but to ensure that two ships will always be available requires that the fleet possesses three, allowing one to be undergoing maintenance, refit, or to serve as a replenishment vessel for the fleet.

"The SAN also needs to further develop its currently embryonic riverine operations capa- bility - it is working to this end," he adds.

South Africa is by far the richest and most developed country in Africa; the rest of the world will expect this country to, more often than not, take a lead in dealing with crises and conflicts on the continent, including deploying forces for peacekeeping and, if necessary, fighting in UN-mandated combat operations, which have become quite common since 1990.

Further, operational support from the major powers cannot be guaranteed - the US and the UK are at war, as is Nato as an alliance (and the war in Afghanistan is mandated by the UN), and their forces are overstretched; in a crisis, they might be unable to help the SANDF.

Proper and appropriate technologies and equipment are thus essential for the SANDF to be able to operate effectively and with minimum risk.

This would not be cheap; but many of the technologies, and much of the equipment, required to make the SANDF and its component forces fully prepared for multilateral peace and security operations in the first half of the twenty-first century have been, or could be, developed and manufactured in this country, supporting the local technology and industrial base.

Source: Engineering News