Background
I am a former Air Force Intelligence Officer, during 1987/89 I was stationed at 32 Forward Air Force Command Post (Intelligence Complex), Air Force Base Rundu.
Recently there have been a number of questions and discussions regarding SA Air Force operations, and here is a summary of a brief that I used to do during that period regarding FAPA/DAA. I am quoting my notes as is, as if I was giving the brief at the present moment’…
FAPA / DAA: PEOPLE’S AIR FORCE OF ANGOLA AND AIR DEFENCE
INTRODUCTION
The Angolan Air Force and Air Defence Forces, referred to as ‘FAPA/DAA’ does no only consist of Angolan nationals, but includes a number of surrogate forces, e.g, Soviets, Cubans and East Germans.
If one looks at the manpower once can clearly see that it is the smallest Arm of Service in the Defence Force, totaling a mere 2,500 (including surrogate forces), representing a mere 1,3% of the total man power.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The following strengths are applicable:
The country has surrogate forces flying for them during operations,
They have air superiority,
They have better and advanced weaponry and electronic systems,
They have plenty aircraft, which is relatively easy to replace following losses,
They have a high serviceability rate,
Excellent radar coverage as well as associate air defence systems, and
Good support services.
The following weakness have been identified:
They have a restricted night flying capability,
Weak command and control,
Ineffective attack/mission profiles,
Weak target intelligence and well as target indications means,
Low confidence of pilots,
Weak radio procedures and
Unprofessional Air Defence personnel.
ORDER OF BATTLE (IIRC this was early/mid 1987)
MiG-21 (46), MiG-23 (50), Su-22 (03), Su-25 (06), Mi-8 (25), Mi-17 (29), Mi-25/-35 (21), SA-316 (21), SA-342 (07), SA-365 (04), C-212 (07), An-26 (22), PC-7 (11) and PC-9 (02).
The following support aircraft are available: AN-12 (11), An-30 (02), Il-76 (04), B-737 (08), B-707 (06) and C-130 (03).
FLYING TRAINING
The following training institutions support air force training:
‘ENAM’ Helicopter Training at Negage
‘ENAL’ Helicopter and Light Aircraft Training at Lobito
Continuation Training is conducted at Huambo, Lubango and Namibe
Weapons Camps and Operational Conversion Training is conducted at Malange and Cedo Ledo (for helicopters) and at Menongue (fighters).
Pilot selections talks place at Negage, which has restricted medical and psychological test facilities. Only one selection is conducted per year, and is estimated that only between 15 and 20 make pilot selection.
FIGHTER TRAINING
All combat pilot training takes place in the USSR.
The course consists of: 6 months language course (basic Russian – aviation focussed), 5-6 months ground school, 8 months flying phase on L-29 Delfin (+- 90 hours), followed by 5 month MiG-21 ground school phase and 5-6 month flying phase (+-60 hours).
On return the pilots conduct continuation training from Lubango.
HELICOPTER TRAINING
All Mi-8/-7 training takes place at Negage, most probably using Angolan instructors. Information indicates that training has also been conducted in the Soviet Union on occasion. All advanced helicopter training takes place at the ‘RAH’ based at Huambo.
Alouette III training takes place at Lobito, and is performed by Angolan and Portuguese instructors. On occasion students have been sent to Portugal for training too. Weapons training and Operational Training Courses as mentioned earlier takes place at Malange and Cedo Lebo.
Initial Mi-25 training took place in the Soviet Union, and it is estimated that training is currently taking place at Namibe.
The initial Gazelle training most likely took place in France, thereafter it is likely to continue at Lobito.
FLYING TACTICS
The Mi-25/-35 Hinds mainly perform rocket attacks with cannon ‘flush-fire’ in the general area of a DZ/LZ to deter hostile forces from attack. The lead will have a second aircraft trailing at about 30deg. In areas where they expect a RPG-7 threat, the release point for rocket attacks is increases to 2,500 ft AGL. Following attacks made by MiG-21s, the Hinds may re-attack the target using 57mm rockets and cannon fire. This is usually done at an altitude of 600 ft AGL and 700m from the target. Helicopters move in tandem during the attack.
Fighter aircraft general use the following basic profile: operate in pairs or flights of four aircraft, transiting to the designated target area at 9,000 to 15,000 ft AGL. Occasionally the aircraft may trail line astern between 3,000 and 6,000 ft. A Forward Air Controller (FAC) directs the aircraft the target. When no FAC is available, one aircraft will do a ‘dummy’ pass to determine the presence of anti-aircraft systems and or fire in the target area. Formations typical consist of 2 x MiG-21 doing the attack, with 2 x MiG-23 performing ‘top cover’, and in some instances an additional 2 x MiG-23 will remain low-level, acting as a ‘reaction force’. In the event of problems being encountered, the aircraft generally jettison their weapons anywhere, aircraft are also not allowed to land with bombs.
MiG-21 ‘Low Dive Profile’: Transit at 10,000ft AGL, 400kts; dive, pull-out at 2,500 – 3,000 ft AGL at 500 kts and then level off again at 6,500 ft AGL.
MiG-21 ‘Pitch Profile’: Approach at low-level (usually 1,000 ft AGL), pitch, roll-in with a 10deg dive angle, release at 3,500 ft AGL, break to left and high – afterburner on.
MiG-21 ‘Low Level Cluster Bomb’: Operating as two or four aircraft, the approach is at low-level (1,000 – 1,600 ft AGL), release weapons overhead the target.
MiG-21/-23 ‘Rocket Attack’: Usually 2-4 aircraft operate in pairs. Approach at 10,000 ft AGL, ingress at 400 – 540kts, attack from 6,000 t AGL in a 10 deg dive angle. At 1,500m from target the first salvo is fired followed by a steep climb. Mostly only one pass is made, however, four passes have been reported in the past.
NIGHT / ADVERSE WEATHER FLYING CAPABILITIES
The Russian and Cuban fighter pilots have limited night training, whilst FAPA pilots have no night training. Night missions have been monitored recently.
Helicopters, on the other hand will not operate in high threat environments at night and in adverse weather conditions. Helicopters do conduct surveillance missions and well as navigation training at night.
No instrument flying training take place and weather reconnaissance missions are only flown by Cuban pilots.
PILOT MORALE
It is very low when compared to that of the surrogate forces.
Noteworthy is the fact that most FAPA pilots are not issued with a ‘g-suit’ and are expected to fly in ‘hot and very high threat areas’, furthermore S&R can not always be relied on, which in itself is very demoralizing!
AIRFIELDS
The Fighter Regiment, ‘RAC’ is based at Lubango
The Helicopter Regiment, ‘RAH’ is based at Huambo
Light Aircraft at Lobito.
REACTION TIMES
RedCon 1: Pilot is in the cockpit. From scramble order to airborne (2 aircraft) is 2-3 minutes. From radar breach to airborne is 10 minutes, which includes positive ID that aircraft are hostile and ID on aircraft type.
RedCon 2: Pilots in crew room/vicinity of aircraft. Time to airborne is approximately 7 minutes and from radar breach 14 minutes.
RedCon 3: Pilots on standby and might not be at the airfield, time increases by 30 minutes plus.
FIGHTER TURN-AROUND TIMES
Accomplish following: load cannon, load missiles, load bombs and refuel without pressure refueling:
MiG-21 = 45 minutes
MiG-23 = 60 minutes
Su-22 = 75 minutes
RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY
The air force has no LL Tactical Recce capability.
MiG-21’s are used to conduct reconnaissance mission prior to operations.
Two An-20 (belong to Aeroflot) have the ability to conduct reconnaissance mission, especially prior to operations. Noteworthy is the fact that the aircraft have the ability to process and develop film during flight as well as perform basic in-flight analysis.
End of ‘brief’
Hope you enjoyed this and learnt something about FAPA.
I have a short piece on DAA which I’ll post soon...