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FAPA MIG-21BIS ‘C-340’ & THE MOZAMBIQUE AIR FORCE MIG-17 ‘21’
“A CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY”
During the late 1970’s and throughout the 1980’s, the Republic of South Africa was facing a steadily increasing military threat from the Front Line States (FLS). The Soviet Union and other surrogate forces, such as Cuba and the People’s Republic of China assisted these states in a military build-up of forces. The Soviet Union’s military objective: dominate the sub-continent.
Within the region, the FLS air forces were busy re-equipping and expanding their capabilities.
South Africa, faced a threat of military action from the North (Zimbabwe) as well as from the East (Mozambique), to a lesser extent Botswana posed a threat too, however their military capability was not as sophisticated as the other FLS air forces.
To counter the appreciated air threat from these countries, the South African Air Force’s (SAAF) Air Defence (AD) capability was focused on protecting the country’s ‘heartland’, i.e. Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeninging (PWV) area. The former Transvaal, was therefore reffered to as the ‘Main Threat Area’ (MTA). The AD capability consisted mainly of a number of static radar sights (e.g. Devon, Mariepskop and Ellisras) and a fighter component comprising of fighter squadrons deployed at Waterkloof (3 Squadron – Mirage F1CZ), and the base at Hoedspruit (1 Squadron – Mirage F1AZ and 2 Squadron –Mirage III series).
To counter/deter air operations from Mozambique, the SAAF had built Air Force Base (AFB) Hoedspruit (HSPT), this base would also support AD operations towards the northern border. Following the commissioning of AFB HSPT, the second MTA AFB construction started, and in the mid-1980’s AFB Louis Trichardt (LT) was declared operational with 5 Squadron, operating Cheetah E. AFB LT units being responsible for the conduct of AD operations toward threats from Botswana and Zimbabwe.
The RSA had appreciated that the main air threat posed would be spearheaded by Mikoyan MiG-21’s that could conduct operations from Mozambique (e.g. Maputo or Beira) into the PWV area. Similarly, Zimbabwe could utilise, the Hawk/F-7’s supported by MiG-21’s from Zambia to conduct similar operations. In the Angolan theatre of operation, much more sophisticated aircraft were being fielded, the most prolific the MiG-21bis, followed by the MiG-23 Flogger. The MiG-23s changed the balance of air superiority in favour of FAPA by 1987, following the shooting down of a 3 Squadron Mirage F1CZ (Capt Arthur Piercy), using AA-7 and AA-8 missiles. The SAAF lacked a Beyond Visual Range as well as a 3rd Gen IR Short Range AAM’s. The accusation of a BVR (V-4) and short range IR (Python III aka V-3S ‘Snake’) commenced, but this was too late.
In the air-to-air environment, the MiG-21bis was appreciated to be the greatest threat to the MTA, and the SAAF’s frontline squadrons; e.g. 2 Squadron (Mirage IIICZ), and 3 Squadron (Mirage F-1CZ), both units forming the RSA’s primary AD capability, supported by other operational aircraft e.g. Mirage F-1AZ.
For decades, intelligence agencies in the western world, had planned and executed actions to obtain foreign equipment for operational and technical evaluation purposes. The RSA, due to the arms embargo, did not have the ability to access these systems/reports as the case was between the United States of America (USA) and their North Atlantic Treaty Organisation partners/allies. The USA since after the Korean War had gained access to aircraft such as the MiG-17 Fresco, MiG-21 Fishbed and MiG-23 Flogger, which were deployed to special ‘evaluation’ units in the USA. The USA and NATO gained valuable knowledge through the exploitation of these systems, and the intelligence evaluation therefore too.
It can be assumed that the RSA, had similar requirements, but were denied access to the information. The most appropriate action would be for the RSA operational community to establish means of gaining access to key threat weapon systems, in the AD environment, the common denominator being the MiG-21 Fishbed. The SAAF would view such a ‘capture’ as a goldmine, allowing the SAAF to evaluate the aircraft’s operational performance characteristics and identify operational weakness’ that the SAAF would use to develop measures to exploit such weaknesses.
SOUTH AFRICAN: MIG-21 FISHBED REQUIREMENT
“Since the mid-1980s, there had been numerous unconfirmed reports of Somali-South African military cooperation. The relationship supposedly began on December 18, 1984, when South African foreign minister Roelof "Pik" Botha visited Somalia and conducted discussions with Siad Barre. The two leaders reportedly signed a secret communiqué granting South African Airways landing rights in Somalia and the South African navy access to the ports of Chisimayu and Berbera. It was said that Somalia also agreed to sell South Africa eight MiG-21 fighters. In exchange, South Africa reportedly promised to provide Somalia with Soviet-built equipment, including tanks, captured in Angola and Mozambique. South Africa supposedly arranged to ship spare parts and ammunition for the Hawker Hunter aircraft supplied to Somalia by the United Arab Emirates, and to be responsible for the salaries of ten former Rhodesian Air Force pilots who already were in Somalia helping to train Somali pilots and technicians and flying combat missions in the north. Despite Mogadishu's repeated denials of a military link with Pretoria, rumors of a Somali- South African alliance continued to surface until the downfall of Siad Barre's regime”.
Should the above prove to be true, it can be concluded that the RSA had indeed made a formal attempt through approaching a foreign nation, to acquire such aircraft.
Why, would Somalia supply specifically MiG-21’s in return for South Africa supporting their armed forces. The RSA had no MiG-21’s and the only use one could see for such aircraft in the RSA could have been:
• to conduct technical intelligence evaluation tasks on the aircraft;
• to conduct operational evaluation of the aircraft;
• to conduct realistic ‘dissimilar’ air combat training (as done in the USA);
• to conduct operations over enemy territory with such aircraft, the element of operational surprise etc when conducting operations over hostile territory.
Furthermore, it is assumed that based on the above statement, the RSA could have had a plan to acquire a MiG-21 Fishbed, from one of the FLS and that a formal requirement or task had been approved at the highest level to acquire this aircraft.
The latter assumptions form the basis for a hypothesis regarding two cases both shrouded in speculation involving aircraft from the Mikoyan stable starting with a case of mistaken identity!
MOZAMBIQUE AIR FORCE MIG-17 FRESCO ‘21’
South Africa had covertly been supporting the RENAMO forces in Mozambique .
Through the involvement of the South African Special Forces, various other agencies in the former South African Defence Force (SADF) would have had indirect and in some cases direct access to the RENAMO forces, via these covert operations. On the other hand, it should be appreciated that RENAMO is most likely to have had sources and sympathizers from within the FRELIMO government and Mozambique Armed Forces. RENAMO through its own internal actions against the FRELIMO forces would have employed numerous techniques, amongst them subversion of government forces, in so doing it is likely that they had known of staff in the armed forces that would be susceptible for ‘recruitment’.
It is therefore likely that through the support of RENAMO, the RSA had indicated that a requirement existed to gain access to the MiG-21 fighter aircraft, operated by the Mozambique Air Force. Alternately, an independent action could have been initiated from the RSA, however, it is my opinion that this would be risky and most likely unlikely. Either way, the requirement to gain access to such aircraft had progressed sufficiently enough for the successful conduct of a recruitment and positive defection.
Lt Adriano Bomba, a Portuguese speaking MiG pilot, was likely recruited by agents from within RENAMO to fly (the) MiG 21 to the RSA and land at AFB HSPT. It is not known whether or not he was a qualified MiG-21 Fishbed pilot too.
The scene is set for a potential classic error in translation and miss-interpretation on the part of the agent and or Lt Bomba.
The pilot had been requested to fly the ‘MiG 21’ from Beira to AFB HSPT, a couple of nautical miles inland from the RSA/Mozambique border. He had agreed to fly the aircraft and defect to the RSA, where he could be granted asylum.
On Wednesday, 8 July 1981, two Mirage F-1AZs, from 1 Squadron were operating over the Kruger National Park. The aircraft were routed to intercept a hostile aircraft approaching from the East, which once intercepted was identified as a MiG-17 Fresco C. Following international intercept procedures, the MiG-17 was escorted to the nearby AFB HSPT, where the aircraft executed a successful landing. The question rises, what were two Mirage F1AZs doing in the air on a Wednesday, that throughout the years has traditionally been a ‘non-flying day’, it is usually used as a ground training day. Flying is rarely done on Wednesdays.
The RSA had finally acquired its ‘MiG 21’, albeit a MiG-17 (for which the RSA had no reason to evaluate), with a registration number ‘21’, that could have been interpreted by the pilot as to have been asked to bring the MiG (with serial) 21 to the RSA…
This MiG-17 was flown on a couple of occasions by the SAAF, before being returned to Mozambique, by road some months later. The aircraft’s wings had been removed ‘permanently’ by the South African’s responsible for preparing the aircraft for its return to Mozambique.
ANGOLAN AIR FORCE MIG-21 FISHBED ‘C-340’
Much has been speculated and written regarding the circumstances under which this Angolan MiG-21bis (C340), piloted by Lt Vinez landed outside Tsumeb, South West Africa (Namibia).
In Angola, the Air Defence network would have detected that a possible MiG was en-route to defect, a little unknown fact was that even during operational flights as late as 1988, the FAPA aircraft (fighters) were never fuelled sufficiently to effect a defection from Lubango/Mocamedes Yuri Gargarin Namibe (commonly reffered to only as Namibe) to Ondangwa, and from Menongue/Cuito Cuanavale to Rundu. During an incident in 1987, a Su-22 Fitter reportedly departed from Menongue, to conduct a reconnaissance mission along the Kuvango River, North West of AFB Rundu. This aircraft crashed several miles from the border due to a lack of fuel, whilst en-route to the target area.
On 14-12-89 a MiG-21bis Fishbed of FAPA, took-off from the airfield at Lubango (FNBU position 14:56South 13:35East). Lt Vinez at the controls of the aircraft climbed to altitude on a general heading of 090deg for a routine ferry flight from FNBU to the airfield at Menongue (FNME 14:39South 17:41East). The aircraft encountered clouds along the route, and Lt Vinez continued eastwards as planned. However on a number of occasions the aircraft entered clouds and upon regaining visual contact with the ground, he no longer could orientate himself as to where he was. After a while, he elected to divert to Cuito Cuanavale (FNCV), South East of FNME.
According to Lt Vinez, he had lost all his visual queues, he had been used to use when navigating between these airfields.
After setting a South Easterly heading, he continued believing that he would soon pick up the beacons of FNCV, this never happened (he was way to the west of the planned route) at this time. The only maps carried in FAPA aircraft were standard ‘Shell’ road maps, these maps are near to useless in the aviation environment, let-alone use it during an Instrument Flight Rules mission!
He continued, after approximately 20 minutes, he had crossed a major river (the Cubago), which he believed to be the Cuito River. The area to the East of the Cuito River was UNITA occupied territory. Continuing on his present course, the aircraft began giving the pilot a ‘Low Fuel’ warning. At that time he elected to attempt an emergency landing, after preparing the aircraft for the Forced Landing, he selected an open field, and executed a near prefect ‘normal’ landing. The aircraft only sustained minor damage.
Contrary to popular belief, Lt Vinez had no intent on defecting to the RSA/SWA. During discussions at the accident site with him, his greatest concern was that he was indeed in UNITA occupied territory. It took some time to convince him otherwise.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this story is that of Vernon Vice only
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