Balerit wrote:
Eugene wrote:
Paul wrote:
I wouldn't worry too much Doug, remember that the navy had discovered in 1983 that they had been caught with their pants down thanks to Dieter Gerhardt!
What a waste of roubles he must have been - If I was the Russians I'd demand my cash back.
I think they got more than their monies worth, remember they received the worlds first and only helmet sighting system which was apparently returned after the Russians had copied it
Not from him they didn't - two helmets were stolen at Waterkloof IIRC. A long way fom Simon's Town. There were other agents you know. At least one major in the SAAF that I know of.
Dieter Gerhardt was an engineer officer. You have to have been in the navy to know what that means. Non-general service officers are sneered at by the rest of the navy, a vendetta going back to the time when they had the temerity to suggest steam might just replace sails. You cannot pass on important information unless you are privy to it - and largely he wasn't. You don't discuss tactics with the engineer - so long as he gets the ship there and back it's all that's required.
The navy gained a hell of lot more from the man than the Russians ever did! The first time I met him - I served under him briefly when he was my engineer officer - the immediate thought that went through my mind was "SS - officer". Cold, brutally efficient and without a heart. In fact his father was interned here during WW2 for Nazi sympathies. As the OC dockyard, the highest position and rank a SAN engineer could hope to attain, which is largely a civilian organisation, he had to work hard to get the promotions. When he got the job he worked wonders at getting a slapgat organisation to run well and efficiently.
So what use was he to the Russians? Let's look what he could have done: 1) tactical information - he seldom would have been privy to any unless the navy was involved and even then his lines of communication were of such a nature that he could not have gotten it to his controllers in time for it to be of much use. 2) Strategic information - he would have known what ships were in commission, which were due to drydock or refit and for how long they would have been out of commission. I am sure the Russian navy would have found it infinitely useful - as they very seldom bothered to venture down this way. Otherwise a few bits of scuttlebut picked up here and there but probably of little use as the navy was not a key player in much of it. He did reveal a few naval projects - and the good they did the soviets is questionable as most of what he gave them was fairly common knowledge in most military journals. He did pass on the information of the extension of Simon's Town harbour. The best description of it I ever saw was in a Soviet naval journal in 1978 - and could only have come from him. What use it was I would not know - the Soviets had little blue water capability this far south. Even crossing the Atlantic used to get a soviet sailor a medal back then. One of his own great defects, and this seems to be a common one with undercover agents for foreign powers was an overblown sense of self-importance. To the point that if he did not have any information he would make some up - or heavily embroider some that he had. To the point where a lot of what he was telling his controllers was untrustworthy.