Benguela wrote:
Someone offers us 4 more. That's a 40% increase.
I suggest you bone up on your math. 4 minis added to the 10 busses may increase the raw numbers but hardly constitute a 40% increase in passenger capacity,
Benguela wrote:
pay us money to take them (the contract we're talking about is 800 million rand - albeit for 5 years, 10 years, whatever it is). But we say "nooit, that's beneath us".
There are no separate budgets in the navy - it all goes into one pot and, surprise, surprise - where do you think the major portion of the cash will go?
Benguela wrote:
As for being an unwelcome draft - that was exactly the point behind manning them with a mix of reservists on contract to do a specific job and training billets for the rest.
Which will only make them more unwelcome. Have a look at the records of other navies who have tried this - the Royal Navy's Fishery Patrol in the 1930s is a good example. Called into being to protect British trawlers from Icelandic gunboats and police the fishing zones. The cream of the Dartmouth graduates never ended up there - and anyone who did would probably, after 20 years service, become a dead-end lieutenant commander being passed over till early retirement followed.
You are suggesting a prostitution of a service. Anti-piracy patrol is classically a coast guard function. A navy is not supposed to play policeman but train up on those shiny war canoes to defeat another navy who wants to attack. (Or attack another navy the political masters don't like). Sure there has always been overlap - but ultimately a navy performs the coast guard job less efficiently than a coast guard - with it's onw tradtions, values and budgets, would. Which is why the DEAT vessels came into being in the first place. The navy did not want the job then.
I say again - just because it floats does not make it the same.
Many years ago, at a seance led by then commander Stinky Retief, this problem was extensively studied, reviewed and mulled over. The conclusions are the same today as back in the sixties. A separate service using lightly armed commercial of-the-shelf hulls laregely manned by civilians but carrying a small contingent of uniformed - preferably police back then - who had the legal power of arrest. It was deemed more important than a navy.
Look at the current naval piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa. It may not be noticeable but the pirates are winning hands down just by the sheer amount of money it is costing to keep a fleet of warships going there. An American professor did a wonderful analysis of costs a few years ago - with a realistic budget for the pirates' outlay - even down to the cost of feeding hostages. An average hijacking cost something - I'm speaking from memory - something like $140000. And it worked from scratch, having to buy everything, boat, outboard, weapons etc. Anything above that was profit. It costs more to keep one warship on station for less that a day. It would be far cheaper to just pay all the aspirant pirates not to be pirates.
Ultimately in virtually every long term terrorist war that has been lost, which is largely what piracy is in reality, that defeat comes to the legal entities because they cannot afford to carry on fighting it. The one side has to try and defend everywhere all the time and the other can pick and choose when and where to make cheap small scale attacks. The books just don't balance in the end.